Weapons and Equipment of the Legion
Weapons and Equipment: Past and Present
Rifles
The primary infantry weapon used during my time in
the Legion was the
MAS-36 carbine. It was operated by bolt action and carried a five round
magazine of 7.5 x 57mm cartridges. The MAT-49 submachinegun was in wide
use by the Legion as well, but I only carried it while on guard duty.
Later on in my service, we were being issued the MAS-49 semi automatic
rifle.
The MAS-36 which was carried by me during operations.
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The MAT-49 SMG had a collapsable wire stock as well as a
foldable magazine for compactness.
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The later issued MAS-49
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Legionnaire from the 2REI is carrying the FAMAS
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Since 1978, the primary infantry
weapon of the French Army has been the FAMAS, which replaced the MAS-49
Click here for a detailed list of the FAMAS
components.
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Light
Machineguns
The Legion used the FM 24/29 light machinegun, but it was being phased
out of service about the time I joined. It was replaced by the AA 52
machinegun which is still in use by the Legion today in an updated
variation.
An older AA 52 which utilized the French 7.55mm round
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A legionnaire from the 1er REP fires the FM 24/29
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The newer version fires the 7.62 NATO round
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Armor
In the 1er REC we used the Dodge 6x6 as a personel carrier and the GMC
truck. The 2em REC also used light armored vehicles M8, and were equiped
with
a machinegun and 36mm cannon. The main fighting vehicle in
the 1er REC was the Panhard EBR which primary weapon was the FL-11 90mm
cannon and up to four 7.5mm machineguns for defense. The EBR held a
crew of four and had a top speed of 100km/hr.
The four crew Panhard EBR was the vehicle used
in the REC while I was serving.
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Currently, the vehicle in use by the REC is the
AMX-10RC
Photo by Former Legionnaire Glenn Ferguson
Translation of propaganda leaflet from the Algerian Liberation army.
Merry Christmas and a happy new Year
Legionnaire!
This is the wish of the combatants from the
Algerian National Liberation army.
Our wishes are sincere and our hopes are the same!
We wish that you celebrate Christmas among those who
are dear to you, under the German Christmas tree.
We wish that the new Year will bring you freedom and a
return home to civilian life.
Your freedom is also ours.
1962 must be for you like for us, the year of return to
your loved ones!
Say goodbye to the French, our common oppressors!
We will receive you as a friend.
All necessary means to
repatriate you are in place.
The winter is a favorable time
to escape.
When on operation near the border, the jump to freedom is easy.
Your escape would be the best Christmas
present for your Mother.
1962 is the end of French dictatorship in Algeria.
By your escape, the New year will be for you the same,
a beginning of a happy and honorable life.
ANL: Service for the repratiation of Foreign legionnaires.
Battle of Dien Bien Phu diary
My thanks to Patrick Hervier for the translation
The truth about the Battle of the Rails in 1948 Indo China
Basic Training
2 - A article from a former recruiting officer about joining
1 - Some Pages from a French Magazine
2 - A article from a former recruiting officer about joining
3 - Changing your identity in the Legion
4 - 3 ways to become an officer
5 - A reply by Charles to a question about running shoes for the cooper test
6 - some anecdotes about the Algerian war during my service
8 - account by "Broken_Wings" about his experience during selection
7 - Women in the Legion article. Courtesy of the On Line Amicale de la Legion
9 - account by "James" about his experience and subsequent leaving the Legion after 5 months
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Here are some pages from an Article in a french magazine about the FFL. (It's all in french)
Article Cover
Article Page 1
Article Page 2
Article Page 3
English Version of Article
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Articles by former recruiting officer of the Legion (chief ajudant Charles Stoeng)
Once you come to Aubagne, the first test is of course the medical test,(if you are
going to live among us we must be sure that you are in the medical condition
needed to live in community).
The doctor who sees you will decide if you are ok or not.
Be fit, clean and without problems!! No eyes problems, no heart problems, no knee
problems. No fucking problems at all.
After all, it is the doctor who will decide, so dont complicate the work for him. If he is
in a bad mood he might send you home because he doesen't like your face. And
he has the right to do what ever he likes. He is the doctor and nobody argues with
him,(this is not democratic at all!! it is the legion).
We got plenty of candidates, so be fit and without problems.
You must convince the doctor that you are in fighting condition and we do not have to
spend thousands of dollars to fix you before starting you.
If you have an medical problem, you are wasting everybody's time, yours and ours.
Stay home.
Considering that you have passed the medical test, next stop is the running test. The
final GO from the doctor might take up to one week (blood tests and x-rays must
come back from the hospital before the final decision is made) meanwhile you will do different
un-interesting/boring tasks inside the camp. No sports, because we have no medical
clearance, so if you have a heart attack and die we are in deep shit.
Finally one morning it will be the running test. This is the standard cooper test, you
will run around an 400m track for twelve minutes. The score will be between 0 and
20 points which is the maximum possible score reached after 3200m.
Once again do not create any fucking problems. Be ready, and do your best. No
shoe problems, no leg problems,no cold or any fancy diseases early in the morning.
These points ARE obtainable, so you want to make sure you can do this with no problem as it
is an easy way to get 20 points. (prepare yourself for this before
joining).
If you pass the cooper test the next stop will be the IQ test.
(I almost forgot, the running test! If you are doing it with 20 russian ex officers and
they all do 3600m. You with your 3200m and 20 points wont get very far, and you will
be going home before the end of the day) So as you can see there is an certain luck
needed to pass. Therfore it is very important to choose the right moment to join.
Personnally I suggest to join in december (few candidates, so little competition).
The IQ test. Do not worry. I know plenty of idiots who have passed. It starts off easy
and gets worse and worse until it gets impossible. Do not panic, and you will get the
score that you deserve. There is no miracle solution juste use common sense and
do your best. As always be awake and try to understand what is going on , do not
fuck up and look like an idiot before the test has started.
So finally you have a GO from the doctor and 3200m on the running test, with an
normal IQ.
You are ready for the security test. Basically this test has 3 differents meanings: First
of all, create your security file that will follow you through your career. Second we
want to know your whole life from day one to yesterday. And finally the NCO will have
to decide if he thinks that you are an interesting candidate to the legion and if he
believes that you will adapt to our system and way of life.
The most important thing to know about the legion's way of recruiting is that we do not
work like the rest of the world.
We do not give a fuck about the candidates, there are plenty.
You have no rights (you are free to leave whenever you like).
The word why?? is forbidden(it is not your fucking business) just do it.
We dont care how fit or good you are, but when we ask you to do something, be
ready, do it, and do it good.
How to be ready? that is your fucking problem.
Just be ready and do not complicate things or create problems.
If you are ready to adapt our way of life, way of thinking, way of working, and ready to
forget the past.
With an complete devotion. You might be the right man.
Charles
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Basic training
Basic training, a post from de Cervens forum by Charles Stoeng 2005
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There seems to be small confusions and misunderstood expectations regarding the contents and final goals of the French Foreign Legion Basic Training.
Due to the particular recruitment (people from all over the world, speaking different languages and having different cultures), the Legion obviously have a few fundamental problems to attend to before starting any complicated “commando” training.
The main goal of the basic training is therefore quite simple and logic:
To change anybody (any race speaking any language, from any culture) in to a basic soldier that is able to operate in normal Legion day to day life.
In other words; giving everybody the same (very basic) language (French), teach everybody (and make sure that everybody understand) that there is one only way of doing things, THE LEGION WAY.
No “personal” opinions, no other language, no Americans pretending to be better than the Russians, no Russians pretending to be better than the Indians, just a bunch of completely equal kids that have very well understood that they finally know nothing.
Most of the ridiculous young “Rambos” on this board that wants to be elite soldiers haven’t got the slightest clue about how the day to day Legion life is, it is maybe unfortunate but they will have to learn.
They will have to learn how a platoon, a company, and a battalion are organized and how it works on a day to day basis, before learning how it operates in combat.
They will have to learn all the boring rules of community life (cleaning, behaviors, military regulations, uniforms, administrative processes, and simply to shut up). All this in a very basic French is finally not an easy task.
It looks soooooo cool on youtube when the Legion is “fighting” its way thru the jungle with the FAMAS in hand. However in basic training you horrible miserable little “Mongols” will first learn to carry it (without doing anything with it), strip and re-assemble it without destroying it.
THEN!!! How to take a very simple aim at a target with a reasonable chance for hitting it, and that only is an art in itself.
You will learn how to operate safely on a shooting range (in French). Considering that most of you have only seen a weapon on TV, it will be a big and difficult operation.
You might be a small arms “specialist” in a previous life, but since you don’t understand anything in French you are a public danger.
Anyway, until the whole group understands how to operate safely on the shooting range any individual “expertise” is completely pointless.
You will have to learn what to put (and NOT) put in your back pack during outdoor operations, how to sleep outside in good conditions, how to make a fire, how to leave nothing behind you, how to make food with nothing, how to cope with the kit you have and not with the kit you will like to have.
You will have to learn about general duties: Guard duties, intervention duties, Rules of self defence… Do you know what a ZMS is ???? well until you know, forget about the videos form youtube. Until you knows perfectly well the compete definition of a ZMS (outlines, limitations, and engagement rules) you are a useless soldier for guard duties. BUT !!! you think that you are ready for jungle training… My ass…
Most of you guys don’t even know how to clean a toilet!!! Some because it was always their mothers that did it, but some because they have never had and hardly seen a WC, but don’t worry you will all learn the secrets of this noble art.
Most of you guys don’t know how to iron a shirt, same reasons… mother did it or they where restricted to t-shirts. Some of you have never owned a tooth brush in your life.
However all these delights of life in community will be perfectly mastered?
After 4 months we will maybe have a young man that knows a bit French, knows the very basics of Legion community and military life. He knows how to hit a target 200m away in almost safe (for his surroundings) conditions; he knows how to launch a rifle grenade without looking like Rocky after a boxing match.
Basically we have a young Legionnaire that knows what will happen next in his day, and why it will happen within this little community.
Now the Legion can start the long and complicated job of making an elite soldier.
__________________
LEGIO PATRIA NOSTRA
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Changing your identity in the Legion
When somebody joins the Legion he has the possibility to change his identity, but it
is not always obligatory.
The candidate can ask for it or the Legion can impose it for different reasons.
If the candidate asks for it he will have to justify why he has this request. Start a new
life, cut whit the past, just for the heck of it are the normal and most frequent reasons
given.
Normally the Legion will change the identity on the candidates request. If they don't,
they will probably just send him home.
The Legion will in certain situations impose the candidate to change his identity.
Criminal background, Married, Divorced, Children, Debts, coming from a country
that do not accept service in the legion, More than 2 years service in the French
army, and any reason that's makes the Legion think that somebody will be asking for
the candidate.
If the Legion imposes the change of identity. The candidate will not be allowed to
receive mail or to communicate with his family or former environment. He will be cut
of from the outside world.
If the candidate has selected himself to change identity he can live under normal
conditions like any legionnaire.
After 3 years of service the legionnaire can make a demand to get back his real
identity.
If the Legion accepts (security reasons) he will have to prove his real identity by
getting birth certificates from his homeland.
After an administrative process (about 4 months) he will get back his real identity.
But he can stay all the time in the Legion using his fake identity until the day he
leaves. Some legionnaires have stayed 30 years using a fake identity.
But the day he returns to the civilian life, he takes back his real identity.
Under NO circumstances he can leave using the fake legion name.
A request for French nationality is always done using the real identity. But if he has a
name difficult to use in France the French administration can accept to "frenchify his
name".
If his name is HAPPITILIUYS it can be changed to HAMON.
But under NO circumstances the fake legion name will be used.
written by Charles Stoeng
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3 ways to become an officer
For a legionnaire there are 3 ways to become an officer.
1 If you are sergeant and under 28 years old, having a university degree.
You can pass the selection test for the officers course in the french army. You will be
competing with the young Frenchmen who just came out of the university (very hard).
2 If you are staff sergeant under 35 years old and have a platoon commander
certificate you can compete in tests for the french army.
If you pass you will do only one year in the branch officers school. (infantry or
cavalry).
3 If you are Sergeant major and under 40 the general of the legion can commission
you to officer rank (very rare)
But for many reasons it is very seldom that a Legion NCO will have interests in
becoming an officer.
And most important your regimental commander has to propose it to you it is not
your choice.
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A reply by Charles about running shoes
Name: Charles Stöeng
Nobody cares if you find the shoes uncomfortable or not. JUST RUN.
If you have a concern about the shoe type, you are already in trouble. Be prepare to
run barefooted if needed.
STOP F.....G around. JUST RUN. Shoes, no shoes, rain, snow, big homosexual
bear running behind you, makeup, blisters, bleeding nose, cold, no breakfast.
Nobody gives a F... JUST RUN.
This is not a US NAVY SEALS test, not a UNIVERSITY entrance test.
There is no PT instructor in a fancy track suit. There will probably be an old, fat,
alcoholic Caporal/chef who is 6 months away from retirement. Ho doesn't give a F...
about you and your worries.
But he has seen things in life that you haven't dreamed about, so do not
underestimate him.
There are few rules and many assholes. So RUN RUN RUN.
Do not misunderstand my words. Nothing personal. I joined at the age of 19, strait
from my Norwegian village knowing F...all about life or the Legion. I had a hard time.
So it is better to get things clear before joining.
Good luck!
Replying to:
Several guys have recommended in letters on the message board that it is adviceable to
take your own running shoes and that you get to keep those.
Replying to:
Can I use my own shoes in the cooper test or do I have to run with the ones that the
Legion gives me.(I've heard they're quite uncomfortable and will make your feet ache for the next two months )
Thanks!
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some anecdotes about the Algerian war during my service
Algeria, 1954-1962
Background
Orders of Battle
Equipment
Scenarios
Bibliography
BACKGROUND
A nationalist movement began to develop in France's Algerian colony (Algerie) after the First World War. In 1954, a War of
Independence broke out, pitting France versus the National Liberation Front (FLN).
In 1958, during a political crisis in France caused by the Algerian civil war, Charles De Gaulle came out of retirement to
become Premier, with the power to rule by decree. Many of the French colonists (les colons) in Algeria felt betrayed when,
rather than leading France to victory in Algeria, De Gaulle negotiated Algerian independence.
A special role in the fighting was taken by the French Foreign Legion. Created in 1831 to pacify Algeria, the Legion was linked
by pride and history to the French colony. The Legion is a volunteer armed force chiefly composed in its enlisted ranks to
foreigners. At this time period, the Foreign Legion included many former German soldiers (even S.S. veterans), as well as many
Spaniards and Italians.
The war lasted for seven bitter years, during which at least 100,000 Muslim and 10,000 French soldiers died. Algeria gained its
independence on 3 July 1962.
ORDERS OF BATTLE
In 1960, the French Foreign Legion comprised 30,000 men: 4 infantry regiments in northern Algeria, 4 regiments in the Sahara,
plus one regiment apiece in Madagascar, Djibouti, and Tahiti. There are also 2 parachute regimennts and 2 cavalry regiments.
A parachute regiment has eight companies and fields 1000 men, of whom 800 are operational. There are 4 combat companies,
one transport, one shock, the compagnie d'appui (light artillery), and the base company.
The base company remains at the settlement where the unit is permanently based, while the rest of the unit is at the field camp.
Typically, four companies are on operations, with a fifth on reserve at field camp.
EQUIPMENT
The French armed forces made use of these weapons in this period:
1936 bolt-action repeater
1949 bolt-action repeater (has a device on the barrel to enable grenades to be fired)
1956 semi-automatic (7.5mm, lightweight, said to be a "killer" at 200 yards)
pistolet mitraillete '49 (9mm submachinegun similar to the Sten)
light machinegun '52 (fires from bands or magazines, very accurate when handled well, but weighing 26 lbs.)
The Algerian forces (fellagha, also known as "the Fell" by the French) are said to be equipped with sawed-off shotguns (most
likely) and Enfield rifles for the most part, and a sprinkling of more sophisticated weaponry (i.e. British Sten guns). The
abundance of British weapons in Arab hands may be the result of weapons lost at Suez.
SCENARIOS
Section Scale
February 1961: Mountain Ambush
January 1962: Encounter in the Mist
Company Scale
November 1960: Searching for the Enemy
December 1960: Mountain Patrol
March 1961: The Gorge
April 1961: Easter Sunday Firefight
Regiment Scale
November 1961: The Tunisian Frontier
SECTION-LEVEL
February 1961: Mountain Ambush
The circle of French troops is growing ever tighter around this valley (at times, operations involve as many as 30,000 French
troops attempting to encircle and capture their Arab enemies). Meanwhile, several small sections of men are hiding in the hills,
waiting to ambush the fellagha as they attempt to escape from this trap. The nights are cold and damp, and the ambushers have
been hiding and waiting for 4 days.
One man waits near the intersection of two mountain paths (pistes), which climb the steep, brushy slopes. His job is to let the
enemy get past him, then to shoot them from behind.
On the fifth night, the listener hears movement, and readies his submachinegun. He cannot see the enemy. Then the chef du
guard arrives (armed with only a pistol). They wait until (by sound) they think the Arabs are 10 yards away, then attack with
grenades. The chief has taken the SMG, and coming out from behind the rock, opens fire on the fleeing enemy. He then
charges up the trail after them.
Confused fighting breaks out, with the French unit (a section? a company? source doesn't say) pursuing the Arabs up the hill.
Three Arabs are eventually found dead. Nobody knows how many got away.
Source: Legionnaire, pgs. 121-124.
January 1962: Encounter in the Mist
A company of legionnaires has been trucked to the bottom of a gorge (using a road built by the Legion in years gone past), and
now the soldiers following a zigzag path toward the summit.
At the top of the ridge, a unit of Arab fellagha are sheltering in a mechta (Arab farm house). It is raining, and clouds form
bands of mist on the hilltops.
The Arab sentry is dozing, and their camp is caught by surprise when the legionnaires arrive. The legionnaires are likewise
surprised. After a hasty firefight, the fellagha retreat into the mist, and the French are unable to maintain contact. The mechta is
burned.
Source: Legionnaire, pg. 176.
COMPANY-LEVEL
November 1960: Searching for the Enemy
in the night, parachutists of the Foreign Legion board trucks for a three-hour drive, arriving at daybreak at the foot of the hills.
For the next three hours they climb, at a pace just short of a run, to a ridgeline at 3500 feet.
As the parachutists rest, spread out in a long line at the crest, artillery and two dive bombers attack the "enormous wooded
valley" below. At the same time, helicopters deposit a company of parachutists on the opposite side of the valley.
Eventually, the original parachutists (perhaps in company strength, though the original source does not say) receive the order to
descend into the valley and "drive" the enemy toward the other parachute unit (which remains in its positions). As for the
Muslims, their goal is to escape the trap or, if they cannot, to make a stand and take as many legionnaires with them as they
can.
Source: Legionnaire, pg.87-89.
December 1960: Mountain Patrol
During the afternoon, two companies (2nd and 3rd) of Legion parachutists scale neighboring hills. The right-hand company
comes under fire (20 men out of action in the first barrage), and the left company is ordered to quickly reach its peak and pour
fire (rifles, LMG, mortar) down upon the Arabs on the first hilltop. The fellagha are in well-dug-in and camouflaged trenches,
which are nearly impossible to see from the other hilltop. Mortar fire appears to have little effect on the Arabs in their positions.
An attempt is made to bring in another parachutist company (1st) by helicopter for a landing on the summit of the Arab-held
hill, but the helicopters are driven off by machinegun fire. (One parachutist finds himself left behind on the hill, but manages to
survive.)
Fighting continues throughout the afternoon. Intensive machinegun fire from fast-moving Alouette helicopters seems to wear
down Arab resistance.
Around 4 p.m., the 1st and 4th companies (reinforcements) advance from the base of the hill and in one line attack. 2nd
Company has been pulled out. 3rd Company continues to pour in supporting fire (and to receive counter-fire). Reaching the
top of the hill, the attackers move from bunker to bunker, firing submachinegun bursts and throwing grenades.
No prisoners are taken. The dead include 53 Arabs, armed with 20 SMG's, 6 LMG's (Brens and German '42s), and "several"
rifles.
Helicopters sight movement in the steep-sided gorge beyond the hill, and the 3rd Company is ordered to investigate. The 13th
Demi-Brigade moves a company into position to block the end of the far valley. The valley is a mile and a half long, with tall fir
trees and thick undergrowth on the floor. Visibility restricted to "a few yards."
The 3rd company advances with one section in front, and two sections to either side. A cave entrance is found, straw indicates
that it has been inhabited, and the helicopters confirm this is where the movement was seen. A volunteer is sent in, but the
search is interrupted when the helicopter spotted reports movement 100 yards further down the valley.
In the resulting firefight, 3 young Arabs are killed, equipped with two Enfield rifles and a Sten gun.
After the battle, a patrol of 3 legionnaires is sent out to recover the Arab bodies, cut off the heads, and return with the heads for
inspection by an officer of the Deuxi\eme Bureau. (Four days ago, "loyal" Arab soldiers rebelled and killed their French
officers, and the authorities want to know if those killed in the operation were these men.) The patrol fortunately does not
encounter any Arabs "passed over" earlier.
Source: Legionnaire, pgs. 96-102.
March 1961: The Gorge
This fight takes place in the "country of the dead" -- barren red-brown mountains, topped with snow, dusty and covered with
wispy scrub, lots of boulders and rocks.
Trucks transport the parachutists of the Legion to the top of the Gorge of Rhoufi, which runs through the plains like a knife
gash. The sides are sheer and rounded, leading down to a river which follows a crescent path. The legionnaires descend along a
3'-wide path to the river, where Arabs dwell in caves and square-shaped dwellings. Then the soldiers begin to climb the far
side of the gorge.
At 4:30 p.m., 2nd Company comes under fire from fellagha who are entrenched in hills at the summit of one of the many hills.
3rd and 4th Companies advance on the flanks, pouring in fire by mortar and LMG, which allows 2nd Company to make the
assault. The legionnaires companies are short-handed, due to stragglers during the long march.
Five Arabs surrender, and 15 are found dead. They were armed with two Thompsons, Brens, and machine pistols. Seven
legionnaires are "lost."
Source: Legionnaire, pgs. 126-128.
April 1961: Easter Sunday Firefight
A company of French regular paratroopers (b/eret rouges) have been ambushed in a gorge, and Foreign Legion
reinforcements are being rushed in by helicopter in the early afternoon.
The far side of the gorge is a vertical rock face marked with caves and fault lines. The fellagha are in the caves. At the bottom
of the gorge are the beret rouges. The Legion 2nd Company (reinforcements) has taken positions on the opposite side of the
gorge, and are engaging the Arabs in a fierce firefight. 3rd and 4th Companies are in reserve beyond the gorge, but are then
moved to positions along the crest of a hill (but still in line of sight of the Arabs). 4th Company is caught moving over the top of
a hill, and seven men are lost to Arab machinegun fire. The legionnaires entrench.
The firefight continues all afternoon and into the night. Two dive bombers provide support, firing napalm and rockets into the
gorge, while helicopter gunships also pour fire on the fellagha positions (one chopper crashes in the gorge). Plane-dropped
flares provide illumination as night falls. Meanwhile, the gorge has been completely surrounded by French troops, and
helicopters resupply their men with ammunition.
By 3 a.m., Arab fire drops off. In the morning, they find 7 Arab dead, and 4 rifles. It appears the Arabs escaped during the
night, along a narrow corniche invisible from the opposite side. The Legion has 17 dead, 46 wounded.
Source: Legionnaire, pgs. 130-133.
REGIMENT-LEVEL
November 1961: The Tunisian Frontier
A Foreign Legion parachutist regiment is spread out along fifty miles of the frontier, each company operating independently.
The frontier is mined and lined with barbed wire, with "no man's land" inbetween the wire (1 1/2 miles across). A line of hills
runs along no man's land, preventing the opposing forces from seeing each other. The French regularly shell no man's land,
patrol the wire during the day, and set ambushes in no man's land at night.
On the Tunisian side is Ben Bella and "a substantial armed force," waiting to lead the Algerian forces (in exile in Tunisia) to
Algiers when independence is declared. The Arabs also attempt to break across the frontier (blasting the wire with explosives),
to sneak forces back within Algeria.
The Arabs are known to have moved into no man's land, establishing a base on one of the hills (making it easier for them to
smuggle men across the frontier). The French know their artillery cannot drive out entrenched men. Therefore, the legionnaires
are sent in to drive the Arabs back.
The French begin with a day-long bombardment of the hill. During the night, an entire regiment of the Foreign Legion takes
position at the base of the hill. At dawn, nine B26's drop their load on the hill crest, followed by two hours of artillery shelling.
At last, the legionnaires move forward. Immediately, the Arabs fire their mortars against the men in the open. The legionnaires
are hard hit, but the fellagha mortars have revealed their positions, and are taken out by artillery fire. The Legion takes the hill,
and pursues the Arabs beyond the frontier into Tunisia.
Source: Legionnaire, pgs. 164-166. Also a repeat operation in December to clear the same hill, pg. 167.
Bibliography
LEGIONNAIRE: My Five Years in the French Foreign Legion
by Simon Murray
ISBN 0-8129-0798-1
Published 1978 by Time Books (U.S.), Fitzhenry & Whiteside, Ltd. (Canada), and Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd. (Great
Britain).
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Women in the Legion article
Courtesy of the On Line Amicale de la Legion
PARIS -- Could it be time for women to serve as soldiers in that longtime bastion of male derring-do,
the French Foreign Legion?
Apparently not.
An announcement last month that women would be eligible for virtually every post in the French Army,
including the legion, was quickly retracted. It was, said a spokesman for the legion, Lt. Col. Yann Peron,
due to a "miscommunication." The changes would take place in the rest of the French Army, but not the
legion.
"When you have the choice - on the front line - who would you want next to you?" said the colonel. "To
go to war, it is a man's business. And it is our tradition, and people do not like to change."
The legion was given its charter by King Louis- Philippe 170 years ago, recruiting foreigners as a way to
control France's African colonies without risking French blood. The attraction was the offer of a new
identity and a chance to become a man of honor and eventually a French citizen. Criminals, misfits and
castoffs disappeared into its ranks (swelled in the romantic novel and film "Beau Geste" with the broken-
hearted, not to mention heart-breakingly handsome).
The corps has served in many of the world's hot spots, from Mexico to Spain, the Sudan and Indochina.
Most recently, legionnaires were dispatched to Bosnia and Kosovo.
The legion's allure has hardly faded. Today, its 7,000 soldiers, who earn about $1,000 a month, come
from more than 130 countries. (Many recent enlistees come from the economically depressed Eastern
bloc.) Most of the officers are French, but it is possible to be promoted from the ranks. Identification
papers are required, at least officially, before signing up, but almost everyone enlisting takes a new
name. Legionnaires are issued Velcro nametags, which they do not have to wear.
Applicants are tested for intelligence and strength, and the legion rejects those it knows to be
murderers, drug addicts, mentally ill or homosexual. While the French Army has two candidates for
every opening, the Foreign Legion has 18, Colonel Peron said, so the vast majority of applicants are
refused.
Women are not completely barred from this storied part of the French Army. The new orders do allow
female officers if they transfer from French military schools. This allows them to avoid the grueling
training - including survival exercises in mosquito-infested swamps - that new legionnaires go through.
But with only about 20 new officers arriving in the corps each year, the number of female arrivals is not
expected to be large.
Will they face a hard time being accepted? Colonel Peron does not think so. In fact, the legion already
has seven women in the lower officers'
ranks. They got in through a sort of side door that allows "specialists" to transfer from the regular army if
they are needed.
One of the seven is the secretary to the legion's top general. Two work in human resources. And four
work in parachute maintenance at the
headquarters of the legion's elite paratroopers, based on Corsica. The men do the folding, said Colonel
Peron, which '`gets a bit physical." The women do the "more delicate work." Yes, he does mean the
sewing.
"The legionnaires are all very gallant, so there is no problem with the women," said Colonel Peron. "And
after all, they aren't spending a month out
in the field together."
TOP
account by "Broken_Wings" about his experience during selection
As I promised you, some information about my time in Aubagne, here it is.
I arrived at Marseille airport 16:30 the 31 of mars. I walked out to get the bus to St Charles (the bus is called Navette Marseille), really easy to find. If you go out from the main gates it is 30 meters to the right. If you come from Paris, you go 30 meters to the left to find the bus. The cost is 8,50 euro. I arrived to St charles 30 minutes later and i took a train to Aubagne. You have to buy a ticket at the station because the ticket will be much more expensive if you buy it on the train. The train to Aubagne leaves every 10-15 minute. The cost 2,20 euro and the trip last about 15-20 minutes.
Once at Aubagne i took right for 100 meters and then left for maybe 800 meters. Then i saw the gates to the French foreign legion.
I got to the gate and an caporal-chef met me. I said something like: I´ve come to join the legion. He asked for my passport and led me into a little room. I sat down on a chair and he offered me coffee. I sat there for about 20 minutes until another Caporal-chef told me to follow him. We went up to the "GESTAPO"-place where everybody who joins at Aubagne sleeps. Once in the building, the took me into a little room where all the common questions begun. Like, why do you want to join us, do you know what we are etc...After that i chose my own name, my parents name, where i was born.
Then they show me into a room where i was supposed to sleep. I met 4 other men there. One Bulgarian ( a very nice man), one Arab and two from Africa. In this room was videos of the FFL and of course there was a vcr.
Some old books in different language.
The next day we went down for breakfast(around 6:00). After that a minor medical exam, then another interview. Once this was done we were sent back to our room. Lunch (12:00). At 14:30 we went down to the "real" selection building. We were sent down to the basement were we were stripped of everything. The only things we were allowed to keep was, underwear, toilettes stuff, cigarettes and your dictionary.
We were given new blue suites and a bag of toilettes stuff, towel, underwear. After that we were sent to the backyard. We did not do anything else that day but we ate Dinner at 18:00. When the siren (alarm) goes of, everybody runs to the front side of the building. And from there anything can happen. At 07:00 and 14:00 civil is sent home but also work can be given to you. You work almost everyday. If you make it to green, you will not work in the weekend which is really very boring
The second day there you take the IQ-test and the test for sanity. It is a really easy test. The IQ-test was really easy, no problems. The sanity-test was also easy, but you had to be concentrated so you did not answered different to the same questions. Tell the truth and you’ll make it. Some of the questions i did not understand because i did all my test in english so i just answered something (yes or no questions). Some of the questions i just didn´t answered at all, because i did not understand them. It was ok, i think.
You do all the tests in the morning, if you fail, you go home at 14:00.
Ten people went home that day. Three were from my group.
If you where not sent home, work was done until 17:00. The work is always the same but at different places. Dishes, corvee, corvee, corvee i think you get the point.
The third day you take the medical test. This test is also easy. You get a few papers were you fill in your past medical. The questions is like, do you have/or had acne, doing drugs, etc...
After that they test your heartbeat, your hearing and your eyesight. You also do an interview with a sergeant-chef. If you pass all these tests, you will be given a vaccination. I do not know against what but everybody got sick. I f*cked up my eye test, so i had only 0,2 on my left eye and 0,4 on my right. I had dust and shit in my eyes and a cold. The more the Caporal-chef screamed at me, the less i saw.. I thought i was going to be sent home that day, but i was not.
They just send me to the hospital at Marseille a week later and by that time my eyes were perfect again. So if you do have glasses, this is not a problem. I saw at least 6 people with glasses making rouge (red).
Once again, people were sent home that day, i do not remember how many.
The third test was the running. Just run seven laps. They had three different places where they ran. Two 200meters and one 400meters. Just run 7 or 14 laps. I saw some people run really slow, but they made it to the next level, and even made rouge, do not ask me why. Nobody was sent home if they made 7/14 laps..
Once again, people were sent home.
After this some people talked to the "Gestapo". I was made green before i talked to them. During the next days (7 days maybe) i made one interview with a lieutnant(chef de centre) and one interview with the chef over the IQ-test and the sanity-test. They ask you the same questions like everybody else, why are you here, where do you want to be stationed, criminal record...etc.
After these interviews i did my Gestapo-interview. Many did these interviews in different order. They say you can do it in your own language but i did mine in English. It was not easy to understand their English, but i made it. The interview was 3 hours long. They want you to tell them everything about your life. Your school, your work and your families work, school etc. They already know everything about you, so they ask your questions they already have the answer to. So the questions is different depending on your past. Just tell them the truth.
If they find out you lie, you will go civil. A little tip is, do your story before you leave, make a little c.v./resume It will help you. I did not, and it is really hard to remember exact dates etc...
After this, you just work. Until Thursday. Thursday is the day you become green or rouge.
If you make rouge, you will be given a commando suit, they will take blood test, dental test etc. A more complete medical exam.
And some other stuff:
They climate amongst the EV´s was good, no fights etc...
If you smoke, take alot with you, cigarettes is like gold at Aubagne.
Everybody gets 28 euro on their arrival to Aubagne.
The foyer is open maybe 4 days a week, you can buy cigarettes, nuts etc.
No EV was beaten when i was there! Maybe a slap on upside the head.
You can use the bar to do pull ups, and you can run at the volley ball court. They encourage you to train.
The 18 of April i was kicked out, the same day my friends made rouge.
At first i had no idea why i was kicked out, but now i think i know. I told the Gestapo everything but on the other interviews i left out some information. So my biggest advice to you future EV is, tell the truth every time and not only to the Gestapo. Keep your eyes and ears open and your mouth shut.
I wish you all the best!!! Bonne Chance.
Best regards
Broken_Wings
Ps. Hi Mr van Raamt.
I forgot to tell you that if you are really good at computers, they will ask you in a seperat interview with the information-officers. I do not know who they were, but i had a meeting with them.
They ask if you want to join them right after Castel..
Maybe this can be an important news to anyone.
Best regards,
TOP
Dien Bien Phu diary
My thanks to Patrick Hervier for the translation
Intro:
In December 1953 the French army challenged its elusive Vietnamese enemies to a stand-up battle. French paras landed on the border between Vietnam and Laos, astride the Communist lines of communication.
The Vietnamese not only attacked, they isolated the French force and besieged it in its jungle base. The hunters became the hunted.
As defeat loomed, the French appealed to the USA where Vice-President Nixon and Air Force General Le May planned to drop atomic bombs on the Vietnamese supply dumps.
It fell to Winston Churchill to block the use of atomic weapons in Vietnam: President Eisenhower would not employ them without his consent.
What followed became a Stalingrad in the jungle: the French were worn down and destroyed. The French withdrew from Vietnam but the country was divided at US insistence, creating the short-lived 'Republic of South Vietnam' for which 55,000 US servicemen would die over the next 20 years.
The French colonial army regrouped in Algeria where a new war began, one it was so determined to win that its officers would ultimately attempt a coup d'etat. Dien Bien Phu is a true landmark battle. Its political consequences were profound.
In 1963, as Washington was deepening its commitment in Vietnam, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev made a telling remark to a U.S. official. "If you want to, go ahead and fight in the jungles of Vietnam, the French fought there for seven years and still had to quit in the end. Perhaps the Americans will be able to stick it out for a little longer, but eventually they will have to quit, too."
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 13
Today marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. By coincidence it happens that the dates correspond to the same weekday at a 50 years interval.
The French Military Intelligence had learnt a couple of days before that the battle was to start on March 13, at that the initial attack would target stronghold « Béatrice », held by 3/13 DBLE (3ème bataillon / 13ème Demi-Brigade de Légion étrangère).
The battalion was commanded by Major Paul Pégot and comprised 4 Coy : 9Company, Lt Carrière ; 10Coy, Capt Nicolas ; 11Coy, Lt Turpin ; 12Coy, Lt Lemoine.
The position was made of 3 small hills, with 10 et 12Coy on one, along with the battalion HQ, 9 and 11 Coy on each of the other two.
At 17:15 the attack began with a heavy artillery bombing of the position, which struck everyone by its might and precision.
This was a major shock for the French HQ at DBP, who knew the Vietminh had gathered artillery around the camp but hadn't imagined it could have been so powerful. This surprise was soon to turn into dismay when it became obvious that the French artillery was not in a position to effectively counter it.
In the early minutes of the bombing, Maj Pégot, his deputy, Capt Pardi and Lt Prungier were killed by a direct hit into their command post. All long-range radio sets were destroyed and it was no longer possible for the defenders to keep contact with the central position of DBP.
Capt Nicolas took command of the battalion and tried to organize the defense of the position, with units put under heavy strain by the Vietminh artillery and without any possibility to get reinforcement or accurate artillery support.
Lt Lemoine and Lt Carrière were KIA in their turn and Lt Turpin seriously wounded. After 2 hours, when the Viets stopped their bombing to launch the infantry assault, there were only 2 valid officers left, Capt Nicolas and Lt Jego, deputy commander of 12Coy (who would also be KIA later in the night).
It was now time for the infantry to 'get on stage'. Preceded by 'death volunteers' whose role was to blow themselves up to open a breach in the barbed wire surrounding the positions.
The bo-doï of Vietminh division 312 launched their assault, using the 'human wave' tactic, recommended by their Chinese advisors who had employed it in Korea.
Defended by less than 300 legionnaires, without any reinforcement nor evacuation possible, « Béatrice » resisted until the early hours of March 14, to more than 3000 Vietminhs.
All officers were KIA, except Capt Nicolas, taken prisoner and Lt Turpin who was captured wounded by the Vietminh released to the French and evacuated to Hanoï the day after.
Around 50 legionnaires managed to escape and join the central position through a tunnel which had been dug below one of the 3 hills of « Béatrice ».
This failure became all the more bitter that, during this same night, the highly respected Lt-Col Jules Gaucher, CO of 13DBLE (2 battalions 1/13 and 3/13 were present at DBP) and the most senior Legion officer of the garrison was also killed, along with Lt de Bretteville and Lt Bailly, by another direct shell hit on his command post, situated in the central position.
Gaucher was the third CO of 13DBLE to be KIA in 12 years, after Lt-Col Amilakvari near El-Alamein in 1942 and Lt-Col Brunet de Sairigné in 1950 between Saïgon and Dalat.
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 14
Following the fall of « Béatrice », Col de Castries, commanding officer of the garrison of DBP asks for reinforcement to Gen Cogny, commanding general in Tonkin (North Vietnam).
5BPVN (Bataillon de Parachutistes Vietnamiens) is put on alert. They take off from Bach Maï military airport in Hanoï and are dropped in DBP in the afternoon of March 14, 1954.
This battalion (along with other units) was part of the Vietnamese army the French tried to set-up, following the formal independence granted to Vietnam in 1950, with Emperor Bao Dai as the head of state. This regime will never be recognised or accepted by the Vietminh who considered it as a 'puppet' in the hand of their French masters.
The battalion was commanded by Maj André Botella, a veteran French SAS, trained by the Brits and dropped with his regiment in Brittany on June 5, 1944 behind the German lines with a mission to organize the local resistance into a more powerful guerrilla force and prevent the German forces present in Brittany to reinforce the Normandy front.
Most of the cadre were French and the troops were all Vietnamese. There were also some Vietnamese officers, among which Lt Phu, a Coy commander.
He would survive the battle, end up later as a General in the South Vietnam army (ARVN) and commit suicide in April 1975, slightly before the Communists entered Saïgon when he realized everything was lost.
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 15
After « Béatrice », attacked and taken by the viets in the night of March 13 to 14, it's up to stronghold « Gabrielle », situated about 4 km North of the central position, to be targeted during the night of March 14 to 15.
The position is held by 5/7 RTA (5ème bataillon / 7ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens), commanded by Maj de Mecquenem, a veteran of the campaign of Italy in 1943/44, reinforced by a Legion 120 m/m mortars platoon.
In those Algerian or Moroccan « tirailleurs » units, the cadre are French, but the troops (including some NCOs) come from North Africa.
Like at « Béatrice », the attack begins with a heavy artillery bombing, followed by an infantry assault by Vietminh division 308, using the same 'human wave' tactic.
Human losses don't seem to be of any importance to Vietminh General Vo N'guyen Giap. Contrary to « Béatrice » however, where chance played against 3/13 DBLE, 5/7 RTA manages to keep its organization intact, stay in contact with the central position to get accurate artillery support and repel the Viet initial assaults.
Around 3am on March 15, div 308, after suffering huge losses, is withdrawn from the battlefield and replaced by 'fresh' troops. Since there's no citadel that cannot be seized if the price to pay for by the assailant doesn't matter, « Gabrielle » defenders are progressively pushed back to the south of the position and are on the verge of collapsing.
On March 15 at dawn, Col de Castries decides to launch a counter-attack to support « Gabrielle », led by Maj Hubert de Seguin Pazzis.
2 Coys of 1BEP, 3Coy (Lt Martin) and 4Coy (Lt Domigo) are designated along with 5BPVN, although this latter unit has been dropped the day before and hasn't had time to get used to the terrain.
It's too little, too late. The ill-conceived and insufficiently coordinated operation is a failure, and only succeeds in recovering about 150 survivors of 5/7 RTA.
During this attack some members of 5BPVN will sit back and refuse to go ahead, frightened by the Viet artillery bombing.
From now on the battalion is taken apart to individual companies and those who failed in their duty are disarmed. The various companies of 5BPVN will keep fighting individually till the end, often with extreme bravery, probably to compensate for the coward ness of some of them.
After 2 days, the two furthest positions of DBP are lost. The runway is within range of the adverse artillery and landings and takeoff become extremely risky, although not yet totally impossible.
The morale is extremely low and some members of the HQ are loosing control. Lt-Col Pierre Langlais, commander of GAP1 (Groupement Aéroporté n°1), starts taking a predominant role in the defense DBP.
In the afternoon of March 15, 6BPC (Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux), commanded by famous Maj Marcel Bigeard, is put on alert in Hanoï.
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 16
« Bigeard is back » ! The rumor spreads across the camp when it is known that 6BPC (Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux), commanded by one of the most famous CO in Indochina is to be dropped on DBP in the afternoon.
This unit, along with 2/1 RCP (2eme bataillon / 1er Regiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes) had participated 4 months earlier (Nov 20, 1953) in operation « Castor » aimed at seizing the site of DBP, occupied by a small Vietminh force.
Apart from being a remarkable tactician, Maj Marcel Bigeard had the reputation of being very lucky. Superstitiously many defenders believed he would bring some of his luck with him and after all, if Bigeard was coming back, this might mean that there was still some hope.
Bigeard was in his third tour in Indochina. He was also a veteran of WWII, when he'd been trained by the Brits as a Jedburgh commando after managing to escape occupied France and join the Free French in London.
He was dropped with his team in Ariege (Southwestern France) to help organize the local resistance.
Many of his comrades officers didn't appreciate the way he was always promoting himself and pushing himself in front of the cameras.
His Legion counterparts (CO of 1 & 2BEP) didn't like him much. For them modesty was part an officer's ethics and Bigeard was anything but modest !
On airborne alert since the day before, 6BPC takes off from Bach Mai military airport in Hanoi and is dropped after a one and a half hour flight on DZ « Simone », South of DBP, near stronghold « Isabelle » held by 3/3 REI of Col Lalande.
With 6BPC is dropped ACP6 (Antenne Chirurgicale Parachutiste or Airborne Surgical Unit) of Lt (Medic) Vidal. This will be the last massive day drop.
Because of the Vietminh flak, the future airborne reinforcements will have to be dropped at night, in small groups, company by company.
After joining the central position and a strong argument with Lt-Col Langlais who has given orders directly to one his Companies, without asking him before (!), Bigeard is ordered to take position on a hill East of the camp, which will later be code-named « Eliane 4 ».
Below is a link to a picture, available on ECPAD web site. It was taken on March 16, 1954 by war correspondent Daniel Camus in one of the C47 planes lifting 6BPC, before their take off from Hanoi.
Along with cameraman Pierre Schoendoerffer, he was dropped on DBP with 6BPC and will participate in the whole battle. Like many others he'll be taken prisoner and will have to walk his way up to the prisoners camps 600 km away.
Let's keep in mind that statistically, 70% of the men who can be seen on the picture will not come back...
Soldiers of 6BPC before their drop on DBP
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 17-20
After the fall of « Beatrice » and « Gabrielle », stronghold « Anne-Marie » is in the front line. It's situated South-West of « Gabrielle » and made of 4 different positions.
Two are on top of a hill (« Anne-Marie 1 & 2 ») and two (« Anne-Marie 3 & ») in the plain, half-way to the northern end of the runway. The position is held by Battalion Thai¯ n°3 (BT3), commanded by Capt Thimonnier and constituted essentially of local Thai¯ auxiliaries.
Very good at small scale guerrilla war, in the jungle they are all familiar with; they are completely unfit in the current situation.
Extremely impressed by the fire power employed at DBP, submitted to an intense propaganda by the viets who are encouraging them to desert via messages sent via loudspeakers (this 'psy ops' method will be used all along the battle), their morale declines rapidly and many just decide to 'vanish' in the dark.
On March 18, BT3 evacuates « Anne-Marie » without fighting.
They are replaced in « Anne-Marie 3 » (renamed « Huguette 6 ») by a Coy of 1/2 REI (Lt Donnadieu) and in « Anne-Marie 4 » (renamed « Huguette 7 ») by a Coy of 5BPVN (Lt Rondeau).
Strongpoints « Anne-Marie 1 & 2 » are not re-occupied and the viets will use them as an observation post. In April, « Huguette 6 » and « Huguette 7 » will be the places of extremely intense fights, as they are the key to the runway.
The remains of BT3 (those who have not deserted) are transferred to stronghold « Isabelle ».
In those days following the two big fights for « Beatrice » and « Gabrielle », the situation is relatively 'calm'.
The viets are occupied in replacing the heavy losses suffered in the first to days and no big operations are underway. Only permanent artillery bombing just to 'keep the pressure', is causing continuous losses.
The big problem becomes the evacuation of the wounded. This issue will get worse and worse and is probably the greatest tragedy of DBP.
The C47 planes used for medivacs can still land by day till March 18, but they can't stay too long on the runway. They immediately become targets for the viet-minh artillery, in spite of the big red crosses painted on them.
Evacuations are terrible : under the Viet bombing, wounded are hastily 'loaded' in the plane with its engines still running, there are even scenes of fight between the most valid to get on board, and after 3 min, the klaxon goes off, doors are shut and the plane lifts off.
They have now to escape the Viet flak and are safe only when the plane is high enough.
Daylight evacuations soon become too risky and a new tactic is decided : during the night of March 19 to 20, 8 planes successively take off from Hanoi¯.
When they arrive over DBP, another plane is doing loops over the positions, with its engines at high revs, to attract the viets' attention. In the meantime, those designated for the medivacs, with lights and engines switched off on the final approach to stay undetectable, land as gliders on the runway which is only marked by 6 very small lights.
The pilots must definitely had steel nerves to land 'blind' in those conditions on a runway partially damaged by the bombings. Some of them were WWII vets who had fought with the Free French Air Force or with the Franco/Soviet squadron « Normandie-Niémen ».
The operation is a relative success and in the first night 93 WIA are evacuated. Night evacuations will continue in the next days, but however the viets will somehow realise the trick. They'll become more and more difficult and finally impossible around end-March.
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 22
Over the days, maintaining the link between the central position and stronghold « Isabelle », about 4/5 km to the South, is getting increasingly difficult. Operations must be set up every day to 'open the road' and repel vietminh units infiltrated during the night.
On March 22 it's 1BEP turn. Led by Capt Vieule¨s, the second in command (Major Guiraud, the CO was slightly wounded the day before), the battalion is to progress from the North and make junction halfway to « Isabelle » with elements coming from this position.
Around 9am, the battalion is pinned down by a heavy ambush set-up by the viets waiting at the junction point. After a 2 hours fight, the viets are cleared from their position, with losses close to 200.
1BEP loses 9 KIA and around 20 wounded. Among the dead are 3 officers : Lt Andre Lecoq, coy CO, Lt Remy Raynaud and Lt Andre Bertrand. They are buried together the following day.
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 23
2Lt Gambiez of 3/3 REI, WIA on March 20, is killed when the Sikorsky chopper which was evacuating him from « Isabelle » is hit by the Viet artillery. He was the son of Gen Gambiez, a WWII veteran who was at this time CO of a commandos unit called 1er Bataillon de Choc.
Gen Gambiez will become years later the Chief Commanding General in Algeria and will be taken 'prisoner' by legionnaires of 1REP during the Algiers putsch in April 1961.
The same day, Lt-Col Lemeunier is taken to DBP by chopper too. He replaces Lt-Col Gaucher, killed on March 13, as CO of 13DBLE.
Uill the end of the battle, Lt-Col Lemeunier will remain the most senior Legion officer on the battlefield.
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 27
On March 27 at dawn, Lt Erhart manages to land his C47 and evacuate 9 wounded. Nobody knows it yet, but this will be the last successful medivac till the end of the battle.
In 2 weeks, from March 13, about 300 WIA have been evacuated. From now on, they will precariously stay in the various underground 'hospitals' of DBP.
Following the loss of a C47 piloted by Capt Dartigues, shot down by the Vietminh flak, and the death of the whole crew, a decision is made the same day to stop low altitude (200m) re supply drops.
Parachutes will be equipped with a timer, permitting a delayed opening and all re supply drops will henceforth be done at an altitude of about 2500m.
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 28
The Vietminh flak is becoming an increasing nuisance and an operation is decided to destroy the AA 37 m/m guns positioned West of the central position.
The operation starts on March 28 at dawn after a heavy artillery shelling. It's spearheaded by 6BPC and coordinated by Maj Bigeard. It comprises another para battalion, 8BPC of Capt Tourret and support is provided by M24 tanks of Capt Hervouët.
The fights are very intense, sometimes hand to hand, and last the whole day, proving how important to the defenders the objective was. The final result of the operation is a half-success (or half-failure?). Many Viets are killed, many weapons destroyed or captured, but the main objective, the Vietminh flak is little damaged.
6BPC has 17 KIA, including 2 officers (Lt Michel Le Vigouroux and Lt Jean Jacobs) and 4 NCOs. 4Coy has no valid officer left (the CO, Lt de Wilde is severely wounded and the deputy was Lt Jacobs). At 8BPC the toll is 3 KIA and 39 MIA.
At stongpoint « Huguette 7 » (former « Anne-Marie 4 »), the CO, Lt Rondeau of 5BPVN is wounded by a mortar shell splinter. He's replaced by Capt Alain Bizard who is not a qualified para but volunteered anyway for DBP and was dropped a few days before, after a quick instruction.
He'll illustrate himself in the battle for the « Huguettes » in the course of the month of April and will remain as one of the most heroic characters of DPB battle. He'll survive the battle and will end up, as a General, as CO of the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr.
The same day, a C47 piloted by Capt. Blanchet lands at DBP slightly before dawn for another medivac. The plane is damaged in a wrong maneuver and needs to be repaired before taking off again.
Not surprisingly however, it is destroyed during the day by the Vietminh artillery and the crew will be forced to stay at DBP, since it will no longer be possible to land on the runway.
Among the crew, like in any medivac plane, is a young « Convoyeuse de l'Air », a qualified nurse, in charge of looking after the wounded during the flight.
She will work for the rest of the battle in the hospital of Major (medic) Grauwin and will become world famous under a slightly pompous nickname given by the press, which will stay in history : « the Angel of Dien Bien Phu ». Her name : Geneviève de Galard.
For the anecdote, she was often described as the only woman present in the battle. This is not exactly true, but the other ones had a slightly less immaculate reputation : they were the ladies of the Legion BMC (or 'pouf') who refused to be evacuated and will serve with a high devotion as auxiliary nurses.
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 30
The French HQ has learnt in the morning of March 30 that a large scale offensive is scheduled in the evening. After 2 weeks spent in replacing their losses after the first offensive phase of March 13-15, getting fresh supplies and digging approach trenches, the Viets are now targeting the hills on the Eastern side of the camp.
This phase will remain known as the « battle of the five hills ». From North to South, there are « Dominique 1 », « Dominique 2 », « Eliane 1 », « Eliane 4 » , « Eliane 2 ».
Vietminh Div 312 will target the « Dominiques », held by 3/3 RTA (3ème Bataillon/3ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens) and Div 316 will target the « Elianes », held by 1/4 RTM (1er Bataillon/4ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains).
According a decision made by Lt-Col Langlais (deputy of Col de Castries), those units are reinforced, during the day, by 4Coy of 5BPVN (Capt Martinais) at D1, 1Coy of 1BEP (Lt Luciani) and one platoon of 1/13 DBLE at E2.
The attack starts at 18.30 with a heavy artillery preparation never seen before and, quickly, D2 and E1 are lost, many defenders abandoning their positions in panic.
D1 is lost after a couple of hours and the road is open for the Viets to the central position. Mixed with fleeing « tirailleurs », they arrive in front of stronghold D3, at the foot of D2, where a battery of 105 m/m howitzers, commanded by Lt Brunbrouck, stops them by firing their guns at point blank range (less than 100 meters !).
His decision has probably prevented the Viets to win the battle that night.
On E2, the vietminh assault is blocked on a glacis, below the summit, nicknamed « Champs-Elysées » by the tirailleurs of 1/4 RTM, legionnaires of 1BEP and 1/13 DBLE, with a constant support from the artillery of « Isabelle ».
It's an open slope up which the Vietminh assaults have to charge through the French fire and which is quickly turned into a 'kill zone'. A counter-attack by a Coy of 1/2 REI is organized and helps relieve the defenders.
Terrible hand-to-hand fights, with all units mixed, take place all night long in the dark or under the artificial light shed by flares dropped from a C47. After being on the verge to collapse several times « Eliane 2 » (A1 according the Viets), remains in French hands at daybreak on March 31.
The battle for the « fifth hill » will last 5 more days. The Viets will lose hundreds of fighters until finally renouncing. This is where, after the battle they will elect to erect their commemorative monument, in memory of all their soldiers killed in that « very small place ».
Dien Bien Phu diary : March 31
In the morning, another Coy of 1BEP, 2Coy with Lt Fournié as CO (suceeding Lt Lecoq, KIA on March 23) is sent on « Eliane 2 » as a reinforcement. At 8.00 on March 31, E2 is 'clear' of any Viets.
A decision is made by the high command, to retake « Dominique 2 », the highest of the « 5 hill », « Eliane 1 », both lost the night before. 2Coy (Capt Pichelin) and 3Coy (Lt Bailly) of 8BPC are designated for D2. 2Coy (Lt Trapp) and 3Coy (Lt Le Boudec) of 6BPC are designated for E1.
Counterattacks are a success and both hills are retaken, however, Gen Cogny in Hanoi refusing to drop any reinforcement (although 2/1 RCP is on airborne alert since March 30), those two units, severely stricken, have to abandon the positions which they are unable to keep. In the action, Capt Pichelin is killed.
For the second night in a row, between March 31 and April 1 the Viets try to take over E2. It's another night of hand-to-hand fights in the dark and successive counterattacks by 4Coy of 6BPC (Lt Héry) and 2Coy of 1/13 DBLE (Capt Krumenacker) help keep the position.
Tanks of Capt Hervouët provide a appreciated support. One of them, named « Bazeilles », hit by a Viet bazooka has its engine destroyed and will be used as a machine-gun nest for the rest of the battle. 50 years later, the wreck is still on top of E2.
After 2 nights of intense fights, on Apr 1 morning, 1BEP counts 31 KIA and 69 WIA. The position is still held by the French.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 1
In the night from March 31 to Apr 1, stronghold « Huguette 7 », held by 2 platoons of 1/2 REI (Lt Spozio, Lt Huguenin) which replaced the Coy of 5BPVN commanded by Capt Bizard, is overwhelmed by a large vietminh offensive.
After severe fights, the stronghold which is falling in ruins, and is not longer tenable is evacuated. In the morning of April 1 losses for 1/2 REI amount to 3 KIA, 15 WIA and 33 missing (presumed killed), including Lt Huguenin.
2/1 RCP (Maj Bréchignac) is on alert in Hanoi since March 30. 4Coy (Capt Minaud) takes off from Bach Mai airport at 21:00. The drop is very difficult because of the shrinking size of the DZ and the Vietminh flak.
Only about half of 4Coy can jump on the first night. The rest have to fly back to Hanoi.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 2
Stronghold « Huguette 7 », evacuated the night before by elements of 1/2 REI under Lt Spozio's command is reoccupied on April 2 by a Capt Bizard and his Coy of 5BPVN.
The position is in ruin. It cannot be held as it is and time and manpower are lacking to rebuild it. A decision is made to evacuate it definitively.
In the night of April 2 to 3, another Coy of 2/1 RCP (3Coy, Capt Charles) is dropped, with the same difficulties due to the small DZ and the Vietminh flak. Planes can drop only a maximum of 10 paras in a row, forcing them to make several loops over the camp.
April 2 is the third consecutive day of battle on « Eliane 2 ». Viet troops are still being crunched on the « Champs Elysées », by the defenders and the artillery, but Giap is still persisting in taking the « fifth hill », regardless of the losses.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 4
On April 4 at dawn, the Viets evacuate the portion of « Eliane 2 » they were holding, after more than 4 days of uninterrupted fights and madness. The battle for the « fifth hill » is over and on the position, the dead are more numerous than the living...
This failure and the huge losses on the Vietminh side will have serious consequences on the morale. For the first time in the battle some bo-doïs are seen dropping their weapons and surrendering.
By listening to the Viet radio conversations, the French Military Intelligence (so-called « 2ème bureau ») will learn that the CO leading the attack on E2 has been relieved from his command and the units participating in the assault temporarily withdrawn from the battlefield.
This will allow the cadre to undertake their self-criticism and the troops to receive further indoctrination from their political commissioners, in the most classic Marxist tradition.
Between April 3 and 4, for the third night, detachments of 2/1 RCP are being dropped on DBP. 2Coy of Capt Marcel Clédic, is back to DBP, after participating in operation « Castor » in November 1953 when the position was taken.
Lt-Col Langlais however realizes that if nothing is done it will take ages to drop the whole battalion. He orders to install a drum full of petrol on a sandbank of the river Nam Youm, set it on fire and use it as a beacon for the C47 pilots.
After a few hesitations, feeling that this is not exactly in line with the regulations in force for a para drop, the pilots finally obey and from now on,
all future reinforcements will be dropped directly on the central position, in the middle of the trenches and barbed wires.
Quite surprisingly, the losses will not be significantly higher, compared to a drop on a 'standard' DZ. This initiative however will not help the already very difficult relationship between Lt-Col Langlais and Col Sauvagnac, the CO of all airborne troops in IndoChina.
On the western side of the camp, stronghold « Huguette 6 », situated at the Northern end of the runway and held by Capt Jacques Donnadieu from 1/2 REI is in front line. His coy has been under heavy strain for several days, following the loss of « Huguette 7 » and Maj Clémençon (CO of 1/2 REI) informs him he'll be relieved on April 5 but orders him to stay on the position until then.
On April 4 at night, the Vietminh attack starts, preceded - as always - by a heavy artillery and mortar preparation. Lt-Col Langlais decides to launch a counterattack spearheaded by a Coy of 8BPC (Lt Bailly), supported by tanks commanded by 2nd Lt Mengelle.
The operation doesn't succeed, and 8BPC is pinned down along the runway by an intense small arms fire. Lt Defline, deputy of Lt Bailly, is severely wounded and evacuated. Lt-Col Langlais orders another offensive to help keep H6, this time with 2Coy of 2/1 RCP (Capt Clédic), dropped the night before (!).
This time, the French manage to break through the Viet lines and when they finally penetrate in H6, they find only a few legionnaires left, resigned to doing another « Camerone ».
Capt Donnadieu, severely wounded during the night dies on April 5. Vietminh losses are estimated around 500, on the French side, the official toll is 23 KIA, 112 WIA and 86 missing (presumed dead).
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 5
On April 5, 2Coy of 2/1 RCP (Capt Clédic) which successfully counterattacked in the previous night to help keep the position is relieved on « Huguette 6 » by 4Coy of Capt Minaud.
During the night of April 5 to 6, the rest of 2/1 RCP (177 men) is dropped on the camp. It took five nights to drop the whole battalion, while 5BPVN and 6BPC had needed only one 'voyage' when they were dropped in the early days of the battle.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 9
On « Huguette 6 », 4Coy of 2/1 RCP (Capt Minaud), is relieved by a 1/2 REI Coy (Lt François). Minaud was holding the position since April 5, when a successful counterattack managed to keep the position in French possession.
His company is transferred to stronghold « Eliane 2 ».
In the night of April 8 to 9 begins the drop of 2BEP. They join their brothers in arms of 1BEP, present at DBP since the beginning of the battle.
A decision is made by Lt-Col Langlais and Maj Bigeard to retake position « Eliane 1 ». It was lost on March 30, during the big Viet offensive on the « five hills », retaken by 6BPC on March 31, but abandoned the same day due to lack of reinforcement.
From a tactical standpoint the decision is justified by the fact that the Viets, from above E1, have direct views over « Eliane 4 », making this position extremely difficult to keep. Any mistake is immediately punished by a Viet sniper or a recoilless gun.
Now that a 'fresh' unit (2/1 RCP) is available to relieve the assault units, the operation appears more feasible. It is scheduled for the following day (April 10). 2 Coys of 6BPC are designated, commanded by Lt Trapp and Lt Le Boudec.
During the night, Bigeard orders to dig an approach trench from E4 to E1, which will help the assault troops to get as closely as possible to their objective under protection.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 10
On April 10 at dawn, after a 30 mn artillery shelling, the offensive to retake position « Eliane 1 » is launched by 2 Coys of 6BPC, who undertake an extremely hard uphill fight.
It's coordinated by Maj Bigeard, from hill « Eliane 4 », where he has had a command post dug. Around 12:00, the hill top is taken by the French after severe hand-to-hand fights. The Viets are repelled from the position, but still holding part it.
2 Coys of 2/1 RCP (3Coy, Capt Charles and 4Coy, Capt Minaud) are ordered to move to E1 and relieve the assault units at the beginning of the afternoon. 4Coy is coming from the nearby « Eliane 2 » where it was positioned since the day before.
3Coy is coming from « Dominique 3 », where it's been relieved by 7Coy of 2BEP (Capt Delafond), parachuted the previous night. In the movement, Capt Delafond is killed by a mortar shell, less than 24h after his arrival at DBP. The two 2/1 RCP Coys take their positions on E1, severely damaged by the combats in the morning and only a few dozens meters away from the Viet trenches.
The same day, on « Huguette 6 » at the Northern end of the runway, Coy of Lt François (1/2 REI) is reinforced by Capt Bizard, with a Coy of 5BPVN, who takes command of the position.
In the night from April 10 to 11, the Viets launch an offensive to retake E1. The action rapidly turns into a series of local hand-to-hand fights, the adversaries struggling for a piece of collapsed trench or an individual foxhole.
In the night, Capt Charles is severely wounded by a hand grenade and is evacuated from the position, leaving the command to Capt Minaud alone. Lt Guilhon is killed, along with several NCOs but at dawn, the paras of 2/1 RCP manage to keep the position.
This is the first day of what will be an uninterrupted 3 week close combats period on E1, where all Coys of 2/1 RCP will alternatively hold the position, untill is final loss on May 1.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 11
On April 11, Lt-Col Langlais and Maj Bréchignac (CO of 2/1 RCP) decide to go on inspection on position « Eliane 1 » which was, the night before, the theater of intense hand-to-hand fights.
In the evening, for the second night in a row, the Viets launch an attack to retake E1, lost to 6BPC on April 10. It's another night of madness, with terrible close combats, on a position where the soldiers risk getting killed or buried alive at any moment by a shell impact.
In the middle of the night, feeling the position might be lost, Maj Bigeard, decides to send a platoon of 6BPC as a reinforcement and ask Maj Guiraud to send 3Coy of 1BEP (Lt Martin), soon followed by a Coy of 5BPVN.
Then, suddenly, as recounted by Bernard Fall in his book, « something very strange happened. Something which, in the recollection of the thousands of men who heard it that night, had rarely happened before in Indochina . As the hundred Legionnaires and French paratroopers stormed across the low saddle between E4 and E1, they began to sing » .
The French and the legionnaires had marching songs going back to their founding, but the Vietnamese paratroopers of 5BPVN had « [no such]… rousing marching song that could be shouted at the top of one’s lungs if only to drive out one’s fright. But there was one song which was then still in the cultural inventory of every Vietnamese schoolboy, and that was the French National Anthem, the Marseillaise.
As the Vietnamese paratroopers in turn emerged on the fire-beaten saddle between the hills there suddenly arose, for the first and last time in the Indochina War, the Marseillaise. It was sung in the way it had been written to be sung in the days of the French Revolution, as a battle hymn of the French Republic.
It was sung that night on the blood stained slopes of Hill Eliane 1 by Vietnamese fighting other Vietnamese in the last battle France fought as an Asian Power ».
Lt de Fromont, from 6BPC is killed at 1.10 am on April 12, but in the morning, the position is still held by the French. In 2 nights, 2/1 RCP, dropped one week before, has lost 19 KIA, 25 missing (most probably killed) and 65 WIA.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 12
Stronghold « Huguette 6 », at the Northern end of the former runway, commanded by Capt Alain Bizard with a Coy of 5BPVN and a Coy of 1/2 REI (Lt François) is being more and more isolated by the trenches the Viets are digging around.
After the big frontal offensive phase of end-March / early-April and in order to limit as much as possible the losses, Gen Giap has inaugurated a new tactic, consisting of progressively 'nibbling' the French positions, and maintaining the 'pressure' with frequent artillery shellings.
On April 12, H6 loses 2 officers, 2nd Lt Thien (5BPVN) and Lt Rastouil of 1/2 REI.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 13
Lt Paul Brunbrouck of 2/4 RAC (Régiment d'Artillerie Coloniale), is killed by a Viet shelling. He had probably saved the camp when - during the big Viet offensive in the night of March 30 to March 31 - he refused to evacuate his position on « Dominique 3 » and stopped their infantry hurtling down from « Dominique 2 » by firing his 4 105 m/m howitzers at point blank range.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 15
A ressuply column, going to « Huguette 6 » to bring water, food and ammos, is shelled by the Viets and suffers 28 losses. The position is now almost completely isolated, since the Viet trenches are crossing the former runway, between H6 and H1.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 17-18
In the evening of April 17, a decision is made by Col de Castries, in agreement with Langlais and Bigeard, to evacuate « Huguette 6 ». Since the position is now like an 'island in a Vietminh sea', it has no longer any tactical interest and resupplying it has got almost impossible.
Maj Clémençon (CO of 1/2 REI) is entrusted with coordinating the operation. 1BEP, reduced by the losses to 2 Coys commanded by Lt Martin and Bienvault, moves to « Huguette 1 » with a mission to block the Viets while H6 garrison is evacuating their position.
Fights are intense and in the course of the night of Coy of 6BPC (Lt Le Page) is sent as a reinforcement.
At dawn, on April 18, Capt Bizard, gives the order to evacuate H6. He knows that losses will be high, since between H6 and H1 they will have to cross several Viet defense lines.
Before leaving, Bizard orders his men to put sand bags on their back and chest as kind of makeshift bulletproof vests. Then, like in 1942 at Bir Hakeim, the big rush is launched to break through the Viet lines, counting on a surprise effect.
The operation is a success, but H6 garrison (about 150 men) has suffered 50% losses, among which Lt François of 1/2 REI, KIA soon after leaving the position.
For 1BEP, who spent the whole night fighting around H1, the toll is 17 KIA and 78 WIA. Following the evacuation of H6, H1 is now on the front line and will be the next 'hot spot' at DBP.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 19
On « Huguette 1 » situated approximately around the center of the former runway, Capt Bourges (1/2 REI) is replaced by Capt Chevallier (1/13 DBLE).
The relieving unit has to fight its way through Viet lines for 6 hours to reach the position. Lt Galopin (1/4 RTM), who was protecting the resupply column, going with 1/13 DBLE element is killed in the operation.
Like « Huguette 6 » a couple of days before, H1 is almost entirely surrounded by approach trenches dug by the Viet 'coolies' and is definitely their next objective.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 22
In the night of April 22 to 23, stronghold « Huguette 1 », commanded by Capt Jacques Chevallier (1/13 DBLE), is overwhelmed by the Viets, coming out of approach trenches dug by their coolies as close as possible to the limit of the position.
Only one survivor will manage to join the French lines in the morning. All the rest are killed or taken prisoners. Capt Chevallier, is reported missing and nobody will ever see him again.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 23
Col de Castries decides to retake « Huguette 1 , against Bigeard's opinion. 2BEP, the less stricken assault unit, is designated for the operation.
Scheduled to start at 14:00, it will be preceded by an artillery preparation and bombing by the Hellcats of the Navy. Supported by 2 tanks, 5Coy (Lt de Biré) will attack Northwards, from « Huguette 2 » while 7Coy (Lt Lecour-Grandmaison) and 8Coy (Lt Pêtré) will attack Westwards, across the runway, from stronghold « Opéra », built by 8BPC. 6Coy (Capt Boulinguiez) will be held in reserve at « Opéra ».
Very soon it appears that the operation is improperly coordinated. Artillery preparation and aerial bombing start while 2BEP has not yet reached its starting positions.
When it finally launches the assault, the Viets have had enough time to recover from the heavy and accurate bombing, send reinforcements and brace themselves for the hand-to-hand fight.
Some elements managed to reach H1, but most of the legionnaires are pinned down on the runway by intense fire of automatic weapons.
Finally, Bigeard takes the decision to abort the attack and withdraw 2BEP. The final toll is 19 KIA (of which 2 officers, Lt Jean Garin and Capt Léonce Piccato) and 62 WIA (of which 4 officers, including Lt de Biré and Pêtré).
Due to the losses, 1BEP and 2BEP are merged two days after into one single unit (so-called a « Bataillon de Marche »). Major Liesenfelt, CO of 2BEP, is held responsible for the failure (some say a scapegoat) and will be sidelined for the rest of the battle.
Following the loss of H1, DBP acreage is less than 4 square miles, making resupply drops all the more tricky. The camp has 2 weeks more to live.
Dien Bien Phu diary : April 30
Camerone Day at DBP. The most senior Legion officer present in the camp, Lt-Col Lemeunier, pays a visit to the command post of Col de Castries, in impeccable uniform and polished shoes.
Langlais and Bigeard are made honorary corporals of the Legion, Castries and nurse Geneviève de Galard are made honorary legionnaire first class and everybody drinks Cognac, pulled from the secret reserves of the Legion.
Lt-Col Lemeunier reads the account of Camerone on the radio, for the legionnaires in the front line. The day is relatively quiet and they, and all celebrate Camerone the best they can, thinking with some nostalgia of the traditional festivities that must take place elsewhere.
The last 4 or 5 days have seen no major operations. Volunteers are still coming in and around 300 have jumped on the besieged camp. Among them is Lt Maurice Schmitt, an artillery forward observer, who will later become Chief of Staff of the French army, in the 80s.
The Viets have taken advantage of those days to get fresh supplies and reinforcements. They are now ready for the final act...
Dien Bien Phu diary : May 1-3
On May 1st, in the evening, starts the most intense artillery preparation ever seen since the beginning of the battle.
For the Viets, this is the final effort to take DBP. On the Eastern side, the first objective is « Dominique 3 », held by 3Coy of 6BPC (Capt Perret) and 8Coy of B.T 2 (Thaï Battalion #2) commanded by Lt Pagès.
After a first assault, repelled by the defenders, D3 is finally taken, in spite of a counter attack by 5Coy of B.T. 2 (Lt de la Malène). Capt Perret and Lt Pagès are wounded and captured by the Viets. Lt de la Malène is wounded also but manages to join the French lines with his unit.
On « Eliane 1 », held by 1Coy of 2/1 RCP (Lt Périou) and remains of 3Coy and 4Coy, merged into one single Coy commanded by Lt Leguéré, this is also the final act. After 3 weeks of uninterrupted fights, on a position where there are hundred of dead bodies buried in the earth, as friable as sand, E1 is definitely lost. Lt Périou is KIA and less than 30 paras of 2/1 RCP, many wounded, manage to join « Eliane 4 », still held by the French.
On the Western flank, « Huguette 5 », held by a Coy of BMEP (Bataillon de Marche Etranger Parachutiste), resulting from the 'merger' of 1BEP and 2BEP, is lost on May 2, after an unsuccessful attempt by the Viets on May 1. BMEP has 32 losses (KIA, WIA or MIA). Coy CO, Capt Luciani is wounded and taken prisoner, 2nd Lt Boisbouvier, MIA and Lt de Stabenrath, WIA. Lt de Stabenrath is recovered after several hours and taken to the hospital.
Like many other wounded however, he'll die after the surrender, in a Viet 'hospital' set on the former runway, for lack of proper medical care and because his case had not been considered serious enough by the Viets to allow his medevac to a French rear base.
« Huguette 4 » (renamed « Lily 3 »), held by 1Coy of 1/4 RTM (Lt Perrin) is lost on May 3 in spite of a counter-attack by 3Coy of 1/13 DBLE leaded by Lt Ulpat.
On May 1, after many vacillations and 'bickering' with Gen Cogny and Col Langlais, Gen Henri Navarre, Chief Commander in Indochina, finally accepts to send another battalion to DBP. 1BPC (Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux), commanded by Capt de Bazin de Bezons is put on alert in Hanoï.
Very surprisingly there will be noone missing when the planes take off, although by now the fate of the besieged camp is obvious. Even the sick, 'escaped' from the hospital, or those whose tour is over and are repatriable will join their unit, to be "with their buds".
2Coy of 1BPC, commanded by Capt Edme, a former Free French SAS during WWII, is dropped during the night from May 2 to 3. 3Coy of Capt Jean Pouget is dropped the following night. Pouget, an assistant to Gen Navarre, voluntarily left his riskless position to jump on DBP.
He'll later become famous during the Algeria war, in particular for his role during the uprising in Algiers on May 13, 1958 that will bring Gen De Gaulle back to power, and after leaving the Army as a journalist and writer.
After landing, the 2 Coys of 1BPC are sent to « Eliane 2 », where they progressively relieve 1/13 DBLE of Maj Robert Coutant.
Dien Bien Phu diary : May 4
Col de Castries visits the wounded in the various underground 'hospitals' and presents many with decorations, while Bigeard and Langlais visit the last positions on the Eastern side :
« Eliane 4 », held by the remains of 2/1 RCP (1Coy commanded by Capt Marcel Clédic + some mortars as support commanded by Lt Césarini), one Coy of 5BPVN commanded by Capt Phu with survivors of another Coy and mortars commanded by 2nd Lt Latanne.
« Eliane 2 » is held by 2Coys of 1BPC and for several days now the Viets have been digging a tunnel below the hill.
At the foot of E1 and E4, « Eliane 10 » is held by the remains of 6BPC, commanded by Capt Thomas, and « Eliane 3 » by one Coy of 1/4 RTM (Capt Nicod).
In the night of May 4 to 5, 4Coy of 1BPC (Capt Tréhiou) is dropped. Tréhiou volunteered to be parachuted into DBP although having one broken ankle, tightly held in a plaster.
Dien Bien Phu diary : May 6
Fairchild Packett #149, with American 'civilian' CAT pilots James McGovern and Wallace Bufford is hit by the Viet flak over DBP during a resupply mission.
McGovern manages to keep his plane flying for about 100 km and tries a crash landing in Laos where himself and Bufford are killed. They must be among the very first Americans killed in Vietnam.
The day before, a new weapon has appeared in DBP, similar to the Russian katyouchas, or German Nebelwerfer of WWII. Those rockets, fired by group of 6, have a devastating effect adding to the already heavy strain put on the camp.
On the Eastern side, 4Coy of 1BPC (Capt Tréhiou) is sent to « Eliane 4 » to reinforce the remaining elements of 2/1 RCP and 5BPVN. The manoeuver takes place under a heavy monsoon rain and the paras are immediately shelled after taking their positions.
The military intelligence has learnt that Giap is going to launch another offensive in the evening.
As a matter of fact, an artillery preparation starts at 20:00 targeting « Eliane 2 » and « Eliane 4 », the last 2 uphill positions on the Eastern bank of river Nam Youm. On E2, the Viets blow off the mine, at the end of the tunnel they've been digging for several days, causing many losses in 1BPC Coy of Capt Edme, without a decisive effect however.
Then, like so many times before, the Viet infantry launch the assault on E4, E2 and E10 (in the plain), held by 6BPC. The last Coy of 1BPC (1Coy, Lt Faussurier) arrives over DBP but the drop is cancelled ;the HQ doesn't want to take the risk of interrupting the mission of the C47 dropping flares to light the attacked positions.
The planes go back to Hanoi. There will be no more reinforcements sent to DBP.
Very confused hand-to-hand fights last all night long, in which many men are killed or disappear. E2 and E4 are definitively lost on May 7 at dawn.
Dien Bien Phu diary : May 7
In the morning, « Eliane 10 » the last position on the eastern bank of river Nam Youm, held by the 'remains of the remains' of 6BPC (Lt Trapp) is lost, as well as « Claudine 5», on the western flank, held by 2Coy of 1/2 REI (Capt Schmitz).
After a meeting held around noon by Castries and his battalion commanders, operation « Albatros » is finally cancelled. The idea was to break through the Viet lines, southwards to Laos and to join a rescue column commanded by Col Crévecoeur.
After the losses of the last night fights and soldiers fighting continuously for 56 days, it clearly appears that it's totally unrealistic.
Gen de Castries has a last radio conversation with Gen Cogny and the decision is taken to cease fire at 17:30. All units receive the order to destroy their arms and ammunition and wait for the Viets to come in.
Stronghold « Isabelle », commanded by Col Lalande will hold till May 8 before surrendering too. After 56 days and 56 nights of fight, France loses its last battle in Indochina.
In July the Geneva agreement will lead to the partition of Vietnam in two states, along the 17th parallel. The last French units will leave North Vietnam in October 1954 and South Vietnam in 1955
Losses on the French side amount to around 1,500 KIA, with approximately the same number of missing and wounded. Many more will die in captivity. On the Vietminh side, estimations are around 30,000 losses, of which between 8,000 to 10,000 killed.
In memory of all the brave men who fought and died in this epic battle, and in particular my Anciens of 2/1er RCP who suffered so much on the « Elianes », I wore all day at work my para wings on my jacket for the first time since I left the Army. Not many asked me why, but many were looking at me a bit strangely...
* 5/7 RTA (Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens)
* 2/1 RTA
* 3/3 RTA
* 1/4 RTM (Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains)
* 2 BT (Bataillon Thaï)
* 3 BT
* 1/13 DBLE (Demi-Brigade de Légion Etrangère)
* 3/13 DBLE
* 1/2 REI (Régiment Etranger d'Infanterie)
* 3/3 REI
* 1 BEP (Bataillon Etranger de Parachutistes)
* 2 BEP
* 1 CEPML (Compagnie Etrangère Parachutiste de Mortiers Lourds)
* 2/1 RCP (Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes)
* 1 BPC (Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux)
* 6 BPC
* 8 BPC
* 5 BPVN (Bataillon de Parachutistes Vietnamiens)
* 3/10 RAC (Régiment d'Artillerie Coloniale)
* 2/4 RAC
* 4/4 RAC
* 1 RCC (Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval)
* 31 BG (Bataillon du Génie)
TOP
The truth about the “battle of the rails” by Alec Forbes
31st February 2004
1.- A train was attacked and all passengers and Legion escort killed at Phan Tiet?? Let’s look at the truth.
On 13 February 1948 the true “Battle for the Rails” began. In the South, the entire railroad network had been destroyed in accordance with Ho Chi Minh’s slogan “Destroy your town, it will serve the country”.
It was in accordance with this directive that the entire towns of Phu Lang Thuong and Bac Ninh simply ceased to exist.
There was only a small railroad operating between Ninh Hoa, Phan Tiet and Nha Trang.
2.- On 13 February the little train was approaching Phan Tiet with supplies and civilian passengers when it was attacked and the passengers massacred.
The Colonel in charge of the Region decided to put into action a sort of armoured train rather similar to that used by Churchill in the Boer War, a fortress on rails. The construction and command of this monster was given to Captain Raphanaud of the 2eREI.
On 10 November 1948 construction was finished.
It was made up of two articulated armoured locomotives, 14 wagons of which 8 were combat trucks, one wagon HQ or Papa Charlie, one armoured hospital wagon, a restaurant/ kitchen wagon and two pilot wagons in the front of the train loaded with spare rails, guirders, sleepers and so on
The train was armed with 8 twin Reibel machine guns, one 40mm Bofors cannon on turret, one 20mm canon equipped with infra-red sighting devices, grenade launchers, two mortars of 81 and 60 and of course all the necessary communications equipment and the whole monster was manned with about one hundred officers, legionnaires and partisans.
The armoured train successfully cleared the rails and life went on as mormal. The Viets, as was their custom, sat back to take stock of this phenomenon.
Then on 29 April 1949 (the day before Camerone) the Viets struck. They destroyed two bridges five kilometres apart while the train as in the middle, thus immobilizing it.
They, the Viets couldn’t take on the train but they could stop it. Then again on 29 July 1949 they attacked the train itself with mortars but it proved indestructible.
The train was nick named “The Rafale” and was never taken. It found a sad but neglected end on some rail siding overgrown and forgotten.
This is the truth about the “massacres” that were promulgated in the Eastern zones.
3.- There seems to be some confusion on the attack that took place on Dong Ha wherein rumor has it a Legion deserter tricked the whole garrison and got them all to surrender! Wrong.
Let’s look at the facts, the report of the incident by the Lieutenant Colonel Battisti, Commander of the 1erREC in March 1949.
The Platoon Pialoux was camped on the RC9 at Dong Ha. Three AM’s “Coventry” formed the defence in their garage. No wall nor battlement encircled the open camp.
On Sunday 20 March at 20:50 hours Lieutenant Pailoux was in his office, his legionnaires in their rooms and a sentry posted near the garages housing the AMs. At 20:55 a burst of automatic fire dropped the sentry with two rounds in his stomach.
The rebels had infiltrated surrounding houses and gardens and from these position launched an attack on the Platoon Pialoux.
The rebels were being guided by a legion deserter who had gone AWOL 30 June 1948. His initials were G..R..
The rebels, taking advantage of the complete surprise, charged the garage holding the AM “Rachaya”, got the tank started and then started firing point blank into the camp and then on to the RC9.
Lieutenant Pialoux ran to organize defence, followed by his legionnaires he set up an FM in an attempt to silence the rebel MG popsitions.
He was wounded in the arm and then received a round right in the heart.
His ordonance received right in his body a bazooka round and the gunner of the FM received rounds in arm and thigh.
The Marechal de Logis Lepage, armed with an FM stopped the rebels in their tracks as they tried to get to the munitions depot, he was wonded in te head.
He was replaced by Legionnaire Mavillod who was in his turn wounded. Legionnaire Rerat put a third FM in battery position and defended the entrance to the munitions depot.
With the tenacity of the defense, the rebels hesitated.
Elements nearby, Maroccans, Genie and the Tran (draftees)) were alerted and came to the rescue. Many enemy bodies littered the ground including the Legion deserter.
The AM “Rachaya” still in rebel hands moved west in the direction of PK7200.
At 22:30 Captain Ducos commanding the 4eEscadron in his PC at Cam Lo, received a message by radio that post 7200 was under attack.
At one kilometre from the post a scout car blew up on two mines and at that moment Ducos learned that his own PC was under attack so turned around and raced back.
He left a group of legionnaires in ambush on the RC9 to stop “Rachaya”. In the meantime a column left Donmg Ha and moved toward PK7200.
Early in the morning of 21 March the column reached Dong Ha and found that the “Rachaya” had been abandoned, a tyre punctured and found on board were two Thomson machine guns.
The Marechal de Logis Bauwens then entered the post where he found only one wounded man. At 09:30 that morning, the fighter aircraft in Tourane (Danang) were alerted to destroy the AM but on flying over the scene, they were reassured that the Legion were in control of the tank and went back to base.
Emeny losses, ten dead of which one was the Eurpean Legion deserter and four machine guns seized. Friendly losses 1 officer killed, 1 legionnaire killed and five wounded (one later died from his wounds, Legionnaire Bonafe).
This then is the true story of what happened at Dong Ha and it has been distorted in Eastern European Press in those days to read that legion deserters seized a complete post and marched the bataillon off to captivity.
Let’s be objective and stick to the facts, warts and all. It was a decisive victory for the Legion.
I trust this is of some help to you and can clarify the truth. All the best, Alec
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account by "James" about his experience and subsequent leaving the Legion after 5 months
Goodbye to the Foreign Legion
Posted By: James. (AMarseille-203-1-2-30.abo.wanadoo.fr)
Date: Saturday, 12 April 2003, at 1:57 p.m.
Well,after over five months in the Legion,I made the decision to leave a few weeks back, and this past Friday I left Aubagne. Joining in the first place was easy, leaving was actually harder. My reasons for leaving were the following:
1.No clear career path in the Legion--Most likely I'd stay at the rank of Legionnaire 1st class for five years, or get Corporal after four years if I was lucky. If cleaning shit for endless hours wasn't enough in "instruction"-- I don't look forward to it for another four or five years straight.
2.Too many damn Russians and other subversives from society. I could write volumes on these clowns but its not necessary...now.
3.Getting my balls busted every day about being American. And with good reason I'll admit...a lot come to the Legion then go home after instruction or desert.It seems the only Americans that stay in the Legion usually have long, previous Military Service or can't go back to the US due to problems with the police. That was the case of one American Corporal Chef who had problems with the police in the US and has been in the Legion nine years. He also was in the US Army for 4 years. And then lots of people are pissed and jealous over US Politics and American Military power...and I had to hear it.
To answer a few questions people love to repeatedly ask:
Age: Not a factor as long as your a good candidate and pass all the tests in Aubagne. I saw people accepted at all ages, 18-40, and actually alot of people in my section were over age 28. In another section there was a 40 year old guy.
Glasses: Unless you have a severe problem that should also not be a factor.
And this are recommended minimums to make your life easy in instruction and then afterwards at your regiment:
50 pushups
50 situps
10 pull ups
2800-3200 cooper
50 squats
100 meters swimming 10 meters swim underwater
Of course the more, the better. If your struggling with just 10 or 15 pushups, get tired of running after 5 minutes...Think hard.
Learn as much French as possible. And for the Americans: Think long and hard--because when one American deserts, you make it hard for the next American who needs to be in the Legion or whose only life has been the military.
The Legion is good, just too many negatives for me. Like someone posted below, I'll just join the American army now.
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